Representations of Nature Limited and Unlimited: A Speculative Essay by Simms, Norman
 Literature & Aesthetics 21 (2) December 2011 page 1 
Representations of Nature Limited and 
Unlimited: A Speculative Essay 
Norman Simms 
 
We haven’t been thinking enough about the multiplication of self-
propelled machines, which have put on our streets, avenues and 
boulevards so many railways that have become miniature trains. 
Steam-driven and electric tramways, electric tricycles, automobiles, 
with the danger of being hit or overturning, or exploding. And if you 
take the trouble to multiply the total of accidents on railway lines 
where there is surveillance by the number of trains which are limited, 
and do the same for the mechanical engines circulating everyday in 
Paris, you will be shocked. 
(Marcel Schwob)
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Introduction 
This passage from one of his daily columns in the newspapers of Paris at the 
end of the nineteenth century shows how fearful and shocked Marcel Schwob, 
a Jewish journalist and short-story writer, was by the changes happening 
around him. The world was no longer the one in which he had grown up; 
technology was making life dangerous. He had seen on that morning, the 20th 
of April 1898, a young man knocked off his bicycle by a larger vehicle and 
nearly killed. Schwob set to thinking about not just the crowded streets with all 
their new kinds of mechanical contraptions tearing along at what seemed 
incredible speeds, but also about what this sense of crowdedness, speed, and 
danger might mean for the future. Railways had been around for two or three 
generations, as had steamships, along with the telegraph, mechanical printing 
presses, and an ever-increasing range of other contraptions; in the 1890s one 
would have to add telephones, motion pictures, phonographs, and the first 
flying-machines.
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It was not just technology speeding up transport and communications, 
changing the way people lived, worked, and related to one another; there were 
also more and more changes in the way experiences were seen, recorded, 
remembered, and transformed into the various arts, from painting to sculpture, 
through music and architecture and dance, with strange new places for 
performance and exhibiting art, both fine and popular. Moreover, these 
changes in what was seen and how they were experienced also caused more 
profound changes in how people perceived, conceived, and thought about their 
own selves in the world. Not only did these pose problems about what could be 
represented in the visual arts and narrative fiction, let alone music and poetry, 
but much more about what representation meant. When people looked around 
them and into the frames of pictures – on the walls of a gallery, on the screen in 
a darkened hall, in the aperture of an instantaneous camera – they were no 
longer sure what the limits were between the outside panorama of natural 
things and the inner theatre of their own consciousness.
3
 
Thus the title of this volume seems to me profoundly ambiguous and 
provocative when it sets up the topic of the limitations of representation. What 
does representation mean and how can there be limitations to it? At first blush, 
the topic would seem to ask for a consideration of how far artists and literary 
authors felt drawn towards completing the age-old quest for mimetic accuracy 
in their descriptions of the world around them, as they saw and felt experience 
and as far as they could use their imaginations and their various skills to 
construct apparently real people, places, things, and events that were not 
factually or historically true, but would persuade viewers or readers that they 
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were at least plausible and probable facsimiles of such fictions. Then, realising 
that this consideration of the topic was fraught with both epistemological and 
aesthetic problems, it seemed interesting to follow through to the next part of 
the title, the question of limits: this could be taken as either the physical or 
tangible difficulties in creating convincing artistic or fictional scenes and 
characters because the entire treasure-house of conventions, assumptions, and 
precedents which the enterprise could be undertaken were now – at whatever 
time the painters or novelists were operative – inadequate; and so ordinary 
spectators and perusers of their works, unless they were naïve, gullible, or 
overly suggestible, would no longer be taken in by the specialists. In other 
words, from a second perspective, there always are limits to representation 
because art and literature are, by definition and in essence, duplicitous acts of 
imitation and products of deceit.
4
  
Additional contemplation raises two further questions on the problem 
associated with the limits of representation. The first of these questions is 
historical, and has to do with radical shifts that occurred in the relationship of 
painters or sculptors or literary artists to mimesis over the course of the 
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Thanks to developments in 
science, technology, and philosophy of mind during this period of history in 
Europe and North America, what could be known about human experience and 
the world in which it played itself out was changed because new ways of 
recording, and then perceiving and recollecting these experiences, had been 
invented. This, by consequence, transformed the expectations and 
presuppositions of what constituted reality and the entire premise of art and 
literature was blown apart; neither the creators nor the consumers of these 
objets d’art and texts wanted to reproduce facts of life. Instead, the purpose of 
the endeavours was to express the painter‟s or the novelist‟s engagement with 
the media through which he or she worked, to project into such a medium the 
very processes of creativity and its limitations, and then somehow or other to 
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make the personality of the artist and the specificity of the struggle against the 
resistance in the media to disappear. This would have left some kind of pure 
experience, something that ordinary old-fashioned patrons, critics, and 
historians would deem anti-art, a defiance of the very society that generated the 
enterprise, an insult in both the legal and the medical sense to the concept of 
art.
5
  
Because there can only be a limited coverage of all the deeper issues 
involved in the topic, the second question to come up is more personal and 
arises from my own scholarly interests. Therefore, I need to set ideological 
boundaries to what can be discussed. In other words, the place of this topic on 
the limits of representation needs to be focused on the tradition and concept of 
Jewish art, something I have been puzzling over and writing about since at 
least the early 1980s. Putting aside the seeming rejection of all representational 
art in the Second Commandment and the development of an aniconic religious 
tradition, how does one account for the actual operational record of Jewish 
artistry over millennia, the specificity or continuity of the controversially and 
uniquely Jewish, and the seeming sudden outburst of Jewish artists, art-dealers, 
critics and historians, museum curators, as well as novelists, critics, publishers, 
literary historians, and professors within the academy? The anti-Semites of the 
late nineteenth century, like Edouard Drumont, and more rabid Nazis in the 
1920s and 1930s sensed this, though their explanations and extrapolations are 
extreme and irrational.
6
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dominated by a Jewish perspective, are at least heavily influenced by this 
distinctive presence. This occurs even when – and perhaps precisely because – 
in many instances the Jewish identity is not recognized as such by non-Jews 
and Jews alike, or taken as a necessitating factor, especially by the artists and 
novelists who disclaim anything but a dubious ancestry, extraction, or 
background from which they have broken and against which they claim to be 
performing, or which is irrelevant, marginal, and incidental to their creativity. 
Except at particular moments of crisis, only the Jew-haters make this 
interpretation, labelling any contentious or dangerous modernization Jewish, 
when it is only the break with traditional restraints that attracts Jewish attention 
and allows for entry into the field of endeavour.  
Yet, if there is anything continuous in Jewish tradition over many 
generations, it lies in a reaction against idolatry, the chief idols of which would 
be a belief in the licit visual representation
7
 of the real world, whatever that 
might consist of, and the even worse idol of vaunting the ego as a deified 
genius, twisted and tormented or arrogant and self-assured. But this repugnance 
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in rabbinical writings to depictions of nature or human forms that are 
suggestive of idolatrous service (avoda zara) is countered by the secularization 
of science that contextualizes the new motives. Jewish experience engendered 
professional expertise in the medical sciences, for example, as an outgrowth of 
several factors: Talmudic requirements to recognize and assess the symptoms 
of animal and human disease; to undertake meticulous care of the injured and 
the ill; to prevent and correct faults in the environment that cause sickness and 
distress and to see in these faults neither the moral corrective nor punishment 
of an innate natural power. Insofar as there are natural laws to be discerned and 
applied, the Jewish mind would understand them as in need of constant 
scrutiny and interpretation, thus adjusting experiences to specific temporary 
and geographical circumstances. This scientific attitude also conditions Jewish 
entry into the popular and fine arts, an entry that became possible during the 
period of the Enlightenment and under conditions of political emancipation. 
Jews did not inaugurate these epistemological and aesthetic changes; they took 
advantage of them and participated in an increasingly active way. 
By the last half of the nineteenth century there were many such radical 
changes in the way in which Europeans could see both the representations of 
reality in painting and in literature and in the way they experienced the people, 
places, things, and events in their own living environment. Popular taste
8
 was 
still based on the Greek notion of mimesis, that is, that the function of art was 
to reproduce images of reality, including historical persons and events, in such 
a way as to seem real, though what constituted real was often a matter of style 
and taste, as well as of official ideologies. For aristocratic and religious leaders, 
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longer dependent on class boundaries, financial means, or educational level.  Taste was 
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The Triumph of Art for the Public: The Emerging Role of Exhibitions and Critics 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books/ Anchor Doubleday, 1979).  
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the real was a depiction of how they wished to be seen and their actions, 
including those of their ancestors, to be remembered. Though there were 
structures in Christian beliefs that changed over close to a millennium and a 
half, the function of artistic mimesis for western Europeans had emphasized the 
picture of reality as religion wished it to be seen, sometimes in regard to the 
characters and events in the life of Jesus Christ, along with those biblical 
persons who prefigured his career and especially his Passion, and those saints 
who imitated the essence of his behaviour and ideals; such religious art 
imitated how the world should be, and the way it really was if the sinful 
accidents of everyday experience could be purged and clarified. During the 
Renaissance and beyond, the representations of painting, sculpture, and other 
visual arts began to include depictions of great men and women, or of ordinary 
men and women in the process of sanctifying their own individual lives. By the 
time of the French Revolution, however, the purpose of artistic imitation was 
to produce such vivid images of great men and great deeds. 
Outside of small avant-garde groups, most people, including most 
artists, critics, teachers, and the general public, could not recognize in the new 
art forms what they presumed to be the real world, both the external and the 
internal realms of experience.
9
 Putting aside petty jealousies and ambitions, 
established artists and prestigious critics tended to view the work of the new 
Impressionists as offensive nonsense; they seemed to see only meaningless 
blotches of colour, incomplete and incomprehensible canvases, and 
unrecognisable persons and places. Similarly, general readers and literary 
reviewers thought of writers such as Gustav Flaubert and Emile Zola as 
pornographers, purveyors of smutty language, and botchers of plot and 
character. Similar reactions to music and dance also occurred, as when 
symphonies or ballets we now find lush and romantic were hissed off the stage 
as cacophonous and confused. But at the same time, from the 1860s through to 
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and taste that governed access to exhibiting at the Salons in Paris or the awarding of 
prizes and contacts, but something far deeper. The academies were official institutions, 
as were the schools attached to them, and their sense of what constituted legitimate art 
– and thus licit representations of reality through art – were not matters of taste and 
popular trends, but deep-seated distinctions in the way the world could and should be 
seen, reproduced, remembered, and interpreted. See Ross King, The Judgment of Paris: 
The Revolutionary Decade that Gave the World Impressionism (New York: Walker & 
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the end of the century, these same audiences and readers took as accurate 
representations of the world the lithographs in newspapers and magazines, the 
wax figures in museums of actuality, the gaudy and overly sentimentalised 
scenes on the stage and in popular novels. Trains, telegraph messages, 
steamships, and telephones also transformed people‟s sense of what was real 
and what were acceptable representations of that reality, so that not only 
expectations of what to see and hear about the world were in the process of 
change. Therefore, the reality itself was reconstructed to match the new 
expectations. These reconstructions were not peaceful, orderly, or gradual; they 
were often violent, disruptive, and sudden as, on the one hand, the opening up 
of new territories for settlement in America, Africa, and Oceania or the 
destruction of old streets and buildings to create a new version of Paris, and, on 
the other hand, the Great War of 1914-18 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
All these changes are not, as I said, merely matters of taste or style, or 
even very much under the conscious will of the senders or receivers of the 
mental messages. They are deep events, hidden in the imagination and 
embedded in the sensory apparatus of perception, or to use the modern 
metaphor, hard-wired into the systems that constitute the mind, and perhaps not 
so metaphorically at all, occurrences in the ongoing expression of genetic 
abilities and proclivities. In regard to Jewish painters, sculptors, musicians, 
architects, and other artists, including vaudeville dramatists, photographers, 
and motion-picture-makers, the radical shifts were, in a sense, not so radical, 
insofar as the individuals discovered themselves. Sometimes some of them 
never realized this phenomenon, returning to the very cultural mentality they 
assumed they had broken away from or had forgotten. 
To understand these changes and how they shifted boundaries and 
stretched the limites or horizons of perception, developed new models of 
knowing, created new things to be seen and recollected, and even to generate 
new meanings for reality and nature, we have to deal with at least four main 
issues almost simultaneously. The first matter derives directly from the topic 
given for this volume; the supposed limits of representation in art and literature. 
I will consider the visual arts mostly, and will focus on changes made in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. To do so there must be questioning 
about what is meant by representation, what constitutes art, an artist, and what 
he or she does. 
The second matter has to do with the supposed or implied contrast 
between the mechanical representation of the world created by photographs 
and other apparatuses developed in the nineteenth century such as cinema and 
x-rays, and the aesthetic representation created by painters, sculptors, and other 
persons calling themselves artists. I will argue that for the most part this 
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contrast or tension between technology and art is an illusion or a delusion: it is 
a myth and an ideological premise, not a fact; it is a reason in an argument, not 
a given truth of the world. Instead, science and art are not mutually exclusive, 
and from the beginning of the new technology it was evident that what 
photography revealed was both more and other than the naked eye could see. 
At the same time, it was also a lesser, distorted version of what artists and 
philosophers believed they could see at a time when natural history was still a 
branch of philosophy, and moral philosophy designated what came to be 
known as psychology, and when theologians were often scientists and religion 
was given a logical and moral rationale by mathematics and the direct 
observation of nature.  
The third matter I will deal with concerns the reasons why and how the 
discrepancy and opposition of art and science came into being, along with the 
struggle between religion and science. In other words, why and how artists 
thought of what they were doing was better, truer, and a more spiritual thing 
than what both scientists and theologians were engaged with. It could also be 
expressed this way: in the nineteenth century, artists and patrons or so-called 
consumers of art began to believe that art was a new religion because only the 
artist, whether painter, sculptor, musician, or architect, could experience the 
spiritual truths of the world. 
The fourth matter has to do with why, in the late nineteenth century, a 
large number (though still a small percentage) of the people engaged with the 
production, distribution, and appreciation of art were Jews, and what their 
Jewish backgrounds, beliefs, and practices had to do with the change in the 
way art was seen and valued in Europe. On the one hand, representing the new 
movements in science and aesthetics as dominated by or at least inordinately 
influenced by Jewish personalities and values was an anti-Semitic smear, from 
the time of Eduard Drumont‟s horrible France juive through to the Nazi‟s 
attempt to discredit all modern art as a product of Jewish decadence.
10
 These 
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 The usual slanders are set forth in this bizarre and yet extremely popular book by 
Drumont – in fact, it was one of the best-sellers of the 1890s – by a journalist of no 
great intellectual abilities and suggested that: the Jews have invaded France, especially 
the more openly despicable examples of the species from Eastern Europe; they bring 
disease, crime and uncontrollable lust with them; they have already undermined 
traditional French morality by their take-over of popular entertainments, the press, and 
economic institutions; they are an unassimilable danger in society, culture and the 
spiritual life of the nation; and they stand for all in modernity that seeks to destroy the 
virile, Christian, Aryan qualities of the „real‟ France.  By such reasoning, Drumont and 
other anti-Semites could stigmatize any person or idea they disliked, or felt threatened 
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same Jew-haters decried psychoanalysis, theories of relativity, and other new 
ways of seeing, measuring, and controlling the world as „Jewish,‟ as somehow 
against the basic principles of Christian civilization and the laws of classical 
logic. 
 
Turning the Lens  
 And the work of man has characteristics which make it superior even 
to nature, for nature is a simple, direct effect of God‟s creative act, 
whereas human action is a continuation, completion, and in a sense 
perfecting of this act itself.
11
 
Jules Michelet, the French historian, who was writing in the mid-nineteenth 
century, provides a good starting point for a discussion of this topic. The 
passage below comes from a book entitled The Insect.
12
 Though he is 
discussing what happened at least three hundred years earlier, what he says fits 
even more with the technological advances made in his own century, and with 
the epistemological and aesthetic implications those changes made. He is 
talking about Galileo and the telescope, and Swammerdam and the microscope: 
An astounding revolution! The abyss of life was unfolded in its 
profundity with myriads upon myriads of unknown beings and 
fantastic organizations of which men had not even dared to dream. 
But the most surprising circumstance is that the very method of the 
sciences underwent a total change. Hitherto men had relied on their 
senses. The severest observation invoked their testimony, and they 
thought that no appeal could lie from their judgment. But now 
behold experiment and the senses themselves by a powerful auxiliary, 
confess that not only have they concealed from us the greatest part of 
things, but that, in those they have laid bare, they have every 
moment been mistaken.
13 
Michelet argues that Galileo and Swammerdam did not just show the 
rest of Europe that there were whole new worlds to explore above and beneath 
the limits of what commonsense had always considered the extent of reality, 
but that scientific thought, and then the artistic eyes and hands, would have to 
be able to articulate the unexpected perceptions that were now revealed and 
                                                                                                                 
by, by simply calling it Jewish. See Édouard Drumont, La France Juive (Paris: C. 
Marpon and E. Flammarion, 1873).  
11
 Elijah Benamozegh, Israel and Humanity, trans. and ed. Maxwell Luria (New York 
and Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1994 [1914]), p. 198. 
12
 Jules Michelet, The Insect, trans. W.H. Davenport Adams (London, Edinburgh, and 
New York: T. Nelson and Sons, 1871). See Kaplan, Michelet’s Poetic Vision.. 
13
 Michelet, The Insect, p. 130. 
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shockingly opened to exploration into words, images, and tangible forms. In 
addition, once the dimensions of the known and knowable universe were 
stretched in both directions from the core of ordinary experience, future 
European thinkers and artists would have to learn how to deal with the legacy 
of commonsense, that is, traditional and logical conceptions they were being 
forced to admit as wrong.  
There would have to be new ways of seeing through artificial 
instruments, so that there would be new things to measure and depict in the 
vast reaches of outer space; before, there were only dreams, fantasies, and the 
infinitely regressive inner space where nothing at all was suspected of existing. 
What if the old language and logic no longer worked? What if the traditional 
ways of drawing, painting, and sculpting could not contain these unexpected 
portions of the universe? With a huge corpus of preconceived notions, 
speculations, and beliefs to be pushed aside, how does one deal with the 
confusion, the wonder, the dizziness, the anger, the frustration, the danger, the 
sense of freedom and exaltation? Where does art begin and fantasy end? When 
do fantasising run out and speculation and analysis begin?  
Projecting his sense of surprise and exaltation back three hundred years, 
however, Michelet had the benefit of hindsight to express his wonder in the 
superlatives and sublime terms of Romanticism. He thus filled out the contours 
of the tragic figure of Jan Swammerdam, whom he calls the Dutch Pascal, 
finding him tragic because he was not only rejected by his family and 
contemporary scientists, but also because he did not have the mental apparatus 
or structures to contain the explosion of new ways of seeing and therefore of 
throwing out old epistemologies and worn-out scholastic categories of thought. 
If Pascal saw an imaginary abyss opening before him, what would 
happen to this Dutch Pascal, who saw the limitless profundity of the 
unexpected world? It was not a matter of a decreasing scale of 
abstract greatness or of inorganic atoms, but of the successive 
envelopment and prodigious movements of being which the one in 
the other. For the little we see, each animal is a tiny planet, a small 
world inhabited by animals still more diminutive, which in their turn 
are inhabited by others very much smaller. And this without end or 
rest, except from the powerlessness of our senses and the 
imperfection of optical science.
14
 
What had been opened up in the nineteenth century, even more than in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth, were the concepts and the experiences of space 
and time. Galileo showed everyone how nearly infinite were the extremes of 
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outer space and Swammerdam how endless the world was below the 
dimensions of the naked eye. Now something happened to the world within 
which everyone assumed they could live comfortably in the environment of 
nature and urban space. Photography first showed that what ordinary 
perception (“the naked eye”) observed was not all that there was to see: the 
earliest cameras picked up details, shades, outlines, and relationships people 
had not and could not have noticed. Sped up and slowed down, moreover, the 
still photograph and then the cinematic camera revealed processes and realities 
below the reach of the eye‟s lens and the brain‟s ability to grasp; and the x-ray 
undermined the differences between inside and outside. Time itself was thus 
not what everyone always assumed it to be: it was now composed of multiple 
instants, it was reversible, and it was virtually the same as space. One could 
hardly believe one‟s eyes any longer, and one could hardly believe anything 
that had been taught in the schools or in the church. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, technology and art seemed to pull 
apart, so that some people could take as a truism that the function of art and the 
artist was to see something more and other than that which common sense and 
the photograph could show. It was assumed, on the one hand – and even Proust 
says this – that a photographic reproduction of a scene or a family was dead or 
at least distorting. Still photography as well as moving pictures presented a 
false version of reality partly because they did not discriminate or focus on 
what was important or meaningful and partly because they presented fragments 
of life; such pieces were false and diminished the dynamic of real persons, 
places, events, and time. In a sense, this is a reductive version of the old 
Platonic canard: that since only pure ideas are real, not only is a painting or a 
sculpture a false image of reality, but it was also only a copy of a copy, because 
anything existing in the world of time and space was in itself only an accidental 
version of what was eternal, beyond time, and infinitely larger than any 
conceivable space.  
These were not merely Platonic objections in the realm of philosophical 
theory rendered through the filter of medieval Christianity, where it picked up 
new ideas of iconology and sacramental reality. It was a different kind of 
hesitation and rationalization of imitations and copies of the world of natural 
things and the higher world of spiritual entities; that is, the biblical injunction 
against graven images, idols, and hypostatic depictions of nature.
15
 The nature 
                                                 
15
 Though Zagdanski takes a highly classical and Platonized view of this alleged 
deathly power of the dominant eye of cinema, disappointing readers who expected 
more emphasis on Jewish tradition, particularly discussions of Talmudic view on 
vision, reproduction of images, and methods of analysis in iconic circumstances, he 
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of rabbinical accommodations of the first three commandments will be shown 
in a later section of this article to fit into both scientific and aesthetic 
movements of the late nineteenth century.  
When we take all these philosophical and aesthetic concepts down to the 
level of ordinary day-to-day life in regards to transport and communication, we 
find someone saying at the end of the nineteenth century what we cited from 
Marcel Schwob in our headnote.
16
 But these changes were not only in how 
people experienced the new world coming into focus around them; it was also 
in what was seen and how they were experienced, causing more profound 
changes in how people perceived, conceived, and thought about their own 
selves in the world. Photography, cinema, telegraph messages; all those things 
were inventions, part of a technology that caused a further wave of tremendous 
changes in epistemology and aesthetics. This was not just a way of absorbing 
and assimilating the revolutionary transformations Michelet saw in telescopes 
and microscopes, where the nature of the universe shifted to an awareness of 
vast new ranges of reality; it also suggested the consequent need to cleanse the 
Augean Stables of the muck of the millennia, to adjust one‟s inner thoughts 
and feelings to new ways of seeing and those new things that could be seen. 
What the nineteenth-century machines of seeing and knowing changed were 
experiences of time and space: time would no longer consist of moments in 
succession, orderly units and measurable patterns of progress, and historical 
development and rational perfection. It would consist of unexpected and 
previously unimaginable instants: charged, dynamic, uncontrollable atoms, 
themselves susceptible to further explosiveness, until time itself had to be 
accepted as relative, reversible, and incommensurable.  
                                                                                                                 
does raise crucial issues, some of which we have attempted to deal with in this article.  
See my further remarks in the forthcoming study of Alfred Dreyfus. See Zagdanski, La 
mort dans l’œil; and Norman Simms, Man, Milieu, Mentality and Midrash (Boston: 
Academic Studies Press, 2012). 
16
 A good survey of these technological developments and their impact on artists may 
be found in Wosk, Breaking Frame. Wosk discusses the ambiguous feelings most 
people, especially painters, sculptors, and architects, experienced in the face of the 
tremendous new powers of speed and energy in their lives, as well as tracing some of 
the debates in regards to industrial design itself, the use of artificial materials for 
domestic and personal use, and the general impact of these changes on how life was 
imagined. Her analysis, however, is relatively superficial, and in particular overlooks 
the subject of representation of nature through the medium of these technological 
transformations. The biggest drawback, so far as the topic covered in my presentation, 
is her limitation almost exclusively to British and American authorities and examples. 
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For this reason, when ordinary people – the great unwashed and the 
parvenus middle-class – judged paintings and sculptures against the standard 
of realism as seen in daguerreotypes or kinematoscopes, the elite, the aesthetes, 
the philosophers, and the artists arched their backs and answered that it was not 
the function of art or artists to reproduce such a flat, dead, and meaningless 
version of the real world. At the same time, these refined thinkers argued that 
the role of the artist and of art was to see more and other than common sense 
perceived; that the deeper insight came because the artist themself was a lens 
through which a higher, deeper, more significant reality could be passed. The 
painter painted not so much what was supposedly out there in the real world, 
but what was in his or her heart and soul – what was stimulated by the 
impressions received from the outside environment, particularly light and 
shade, atmospheric conditions, and profound emotions within his or her own 
experience.  
With reason, some artists and critics began to speak of the function of 
art as the expression of these highly personal, eccentric, and sensitive feelings 
using the images, the colours, the shapes, and the intensities of light from out 
there; what was created was not a picture of a natural scene or a particular 
person, but of the artist themselves or, rather, of the process by which art is 
created. This can include the energies that confront the irresolvable tension 
between what art can glimpse in instantaneous, transient moments of ecstasy 
and what the medium can contain, whether colour, shape, musical sound, 
choreographed motion, or literary words.  
By such reasoning, intuition, and ideological assertion, another 
presumed truism was confected, namely, that the person who proclaims him or 
herself an artist – no matter what the ecstasy or despair of this proclamation – 
is more important than the thing created and, as a further corollary to this, that 
the artist is a person of a different quality and constitution than the ordinary 
middle-class consumer of culture. Whatever the self-proclaimed artist does is 
art, and that work and object of art – not really the product of work and not 
really an object like any other – is to be valued or worshipped in and of itself, 
as in art for art‟s sake, purely because it expresses the artist‟s painful joy in 
creation and because it offends and confuses the unsophisticated spectator or 
auditor.  
Coming back to our opening statement about the contrast or the mutual 
exclusivity of art and photographic reality, it has been implied that all this is an 
ideological construct, a romantic myth, and a self-indulgent delusion. Why? 
First of all, if we examine closely what was going on in nineteenth-century 
Europe in regard to the technological innovations of photography in its 
broadest sense, from daguerreotypes through cinema to x-rays, we find that 
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both scientists and artists were shocked to discover that what was reproduced 
did not match either their experiential perceptions of the real, natural world or 
their inherited logical paradigms or aesthetic conventions. They came to realize 
almost from the first moment of being able to fix images from a camera 
obscura apparatus that the impersonal machine had as many limits as the naked 
eye.  
Thus, in the second place, when comparing the natural perceptions of 
the world and the artistic conventions that had developed since the Renaissance 
to represent the environment in pictures and in statues, to the images and forms 
revealed by the photograph, there was a difference in both what was seen and 
how it could be interpreted. The camera showed everything so that the mental 
discrimination that had evolved to help people operate in the world and make 
vital decisions without being diverted or confused by irrelevant or dangerous 
details was now shown up for what it was: blinkers, filters, and censors. A 
scene of nature or a portrait of a person or a family did not contain all that was 
there, and reality consisted of things, angles, colours, shapes, and relationships 
that had been overlooked and denied. Yet, our experiences had been influenced 
without that influence being registered.
17
  
In other words, both what common sense seemed to have always seen 
and what artistic tradition had taught us to understand as important and 
meaningful could no longer be trusted. Yet, the photograph also missed out on 
many significant facets of reality, precisely those tonalities, intensities, and 
perspectives that each human being experienced in their address to the world 
around them. The camera could also not be trusted to offer reality at face value. 
To equate reality with a snapshot was as unsophisticated as to accept what the 
Academy of Fine Arts taught was real or historic or true. Impressionistic 
painters were making variations of realistic or romantic versions of reality; 
when they took into account the colour of shadows or the seasonal changes in 
the way light filters through the air, they were still trying to depict what made 
an impression on them.  
These major changes in perception, conceptualization, and evaluation of 
the real world and the world of art and science did not just happen in the élite 
atmosphere of Paris or Vienna, Berlin or London. There were two other places 
                                                 
17
 The main authority for these matters remains Aaron Scharf, Art and Photography 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974 [1968]). Many of the early motion pictures 
discussed in Scharf are available on YouTube. See also King, The Judgment of Paris; 
Peter H. Feist, Impressionism in France, ed. Inigo F. Walter (Koln: Taschen, 2010 
[1993]); and Julien Bell, Mirror of the World: A New History of Art (London: Thames 
& Hudson, 2007). 
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for the transformations in epistemology and aesthetics, and they sometimes 
literally infringed on the elite salons and lecture theatres; they all overlapped 
and interloped with each other.  
As we have already suggested, the changes occurring in the popular 
imagination were also moving into matters of taste and style; that is, into what 
was experienced in the street, at the fair, on the music-hall stage, and inside the 
newly darkened rooms where cinema was shown. In fact, it was precisely out 
of the rather low „popular‟ venues of magic lanterns, prestidigitation 
performers, circus clowns, and side-shows with freaks, nude artists, and 
pornographic dancers that the old-fashioned trickery of the phantasmagoria 
elided with the post-impressionistic and modernist experiments and 
experiences of the avant garde artists.  
A phantasmagoria is not only a metaphorical phenomenon, wherein 
gaudy and seductive lights, sounds, actions, performers, and images 
concentrate themselves. It is a type of popular stage performance based on 
trickery, duplicity, and illusion. Instead of this historical designation, many 
authors have used the term fantasmagorie to categorize delusive imaginings. 
Others have taken the word to describe reasonable or aesthetically illuminating 
arguments, convincing investigations and demonstrations of what is true, good, 
and beautiful in areas where it may be questioned and challenged, so that the 
phantasmagoria offers magic and mystification in a metaphorical sense. It is 
therefore nothing less than a festival of delusion and hysteria and an idolatrous 
copy of a misconstrued reality.
18
 
Second, again as I have hinted, the theoretical and imaginary changes of 
the fin de siècle were pushed forward because of the large and inordinate 
number of Jews who were entrepreneurs, impresarios, directors, composers, 
performers, actors, and critics: the changes were not Jewish changes, as the 
anti-Semites charged. In fact, some of the most profound critics against these 
trends were Jewish intellectuals, like Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau, who 
saw imbecility, madness, criminality, degeneration, and other unnatural forces 
let loose by these ideas in art and philosophy.  
The popular and refined arts were, more than other areas of the 
modernizing and secularizing societies where they appeared, open or at least 
tolerant of Jews; Jews, breaking away, so they thought, from archaic and 
degrading situations and backgrounds, felt more at home, more warmly 
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 For references and further discussions see Norman Simms, „The Phantasmagoria of 
Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism,‟ Mentalities/Mentalités, vol. 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 52-
64. 
Norman Simms 
 
Literature & Aesthetics 21 (2) December 2011 page 17 
welcomed, and better appreciated by the non-Jewish colleagues and associates, 
audiences, and patrons than anywhere else they had traditionally been, 
including in their own families.
19
 As Kenneth E. Silver puts it: 
suddenly, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as if a mist had 
lifted, there were scores of Jewish artists to be seen on all the artistic 
horizons and nowhere more densely concentrated than in Paris.
20 
In a sense, these Jewish painters, musicians, and critics, along with others at 
various points in the great chain of art production, distribution, and 
preservation, entered into a kind of marriage with their non-Jewish partners and 
rivals. But it was a problematic kind of a marriage, and one that was riddled 
with difficulties all along the way, falling apart into relatively amicable 
separations and into rancorous divorce with sometimes deadly consequences.
21
 
                                                 
19
 The cliché that usually comes up is that Jews represent a caricature version of 
modern man insofar as he is beset by anxiety that leads to introspection and the 
gouging out of new interiorized space in consciousness and unconsciousness, 
discomfort that leads to innovatory research in the arts and sciences, and restlessness 
that leads to the breakdown of traditional modes of relationship and the invention of 
highly individualized and temporary paradigms of personality in the group.  But the 
cliché is reinforced by the anti-Semitic ravings of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
so should be used with caution, except insofar as these Jew haters often sense changes 
in the atmosphere, even if they misattribute the causation entirely to Jews and then 
demonize the Jew for the madness they experience in themselves. 
20
 Kenneth E. Silver, „Introduction,‟ in The Circle of Montparnasse: Jewish Artists in 
Paris, 1905-1945, eds Kenneth E. Silver and Romy Golan (New York: Universe Books 
for The Jewish Museum, 1985), p. 10. 
21
 A vile and vicious discourse on these matters can be found in a booklet like that by 
Lucien Rebatet, Les tribus du cinéma et du théâtre (Paris: Nouvelles Editions 
Françaises, 2007[1941]). Rebatet was one of the gang of French Nazi sympathizers 
who after the war was condemned to be hanged but was somehow pardoned.  He and 
his ilk published a series of four books under the rubric „Les Juifs en France‟ in 1940-
1941 in a collaborationist press established to circulate anti-Semitic propaganda for the 
occupying Nazis; see the reprinted inaugural promotion booklet by Lenculus in Paris in 
March 2008 (Librairie Excommuniée Numérique des Curieux de Lire les USuels), the 
cover of which proudly displays a certificate of „Politiquement Incorrect.‟ For all this, 
such books are valuable for at least three reasons: (1) they reveal the names and 
thoughts of those Frenchmen and women who eagerly shared the Nazi racist ideology 
or were cynically and amorally willing to collaborate in the anti-Semitic project; (2) 
they bring back into view many of the persons involved in the establishment of the 
cinematic and popular theatrical world in France during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, names forgotten or suppressed almost everywhere else in 
discussions of motion pictures and music hall entertainments; and (3) they transmit, 
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Roger Fry believes that the breakdown in accommodation between all the 
innovative knowledge and speculations of the nineteenth century and the vast 
heap of inherited ideas and images occurred around the year 1910. In England, 
at an exhibition of contemporary art from France, the public response could not 
be denied: people could not fit the new styles and fashions into their traditional 
patterns of reception. This V-spot that triggered the divorce arose from the 
ancient concept – and controversy – of mimesis. 
The difficulty springs from a deep-rooted conviction due to long-
established custom, that the aim of painting is the descriptive 
imitation of natural forms [mimesis]. Now, these artists do not seek 
to give what can, after all, be but a pale reflex of actual appearance, 
but to arouse the conviction of a new and definite reality. They do 
not seek to imitate form, but to create form; not to imitate life, but to 
find an equivalent for life. By that I mean that they wish to make 
images which by the clearness of their logical structure, and by their 
closely-knit unity of texture, shall appeal to our disinterested and 
contemplative imagination with something of the same vividness 
[enargeia] as the things of actual life appeal of to our practical 
activities. In fact, they aim not at illusion but at reality.
22 
To Fry and others on both sides of the debate over the purposes and values of 
modern art, what is missing in their argument are precisely those qualities of 
the new ideas in science and aesthetics that drew in so many Jewish men and 
women out of their customary homes and study-halls and into studios, 
laboratories, art galleries, natural history museums, and even to the salons of 
the aristocracy and the upper middle-class; the cafes of the bohemians and the 
political radicals where they felt welcomed as equals and sometimes as leaders. 
As hinted above, the nature of rabbinical accommodations of the first 
three commandments fit into both scientific and aesthetic movements of the 
late nineteenth century.
23
 The first commandment proclaims the unique and all-
                                                                                                                 
hidden in the poisonous soup of racial hatred and slander, some interesting ideas about 
the nature of Jewish aesthetics, because, as we have suggested elsewhere, most people, 
Jewish and non-Jewish, have denied, controverted, or ignored these suggestions. These 
are ideas that need to be examined in a more sympathetic light. 
22
 Roger Fry, „The French Post-Impressionists,‟ in Vision and Design (London: Chatto 
and Windus, 1928), p. 195. 
23
 Rather than essentialising the Jew as the anti-Semites do, and attributing to this 
iconic personality powers of transcendent timelessness and extrasensory perceptions – 
all Jews always know at any time what every other Jew feels and thinks, and the 
conspiracy is a spontaneous act of racial demonology – it is important to recall that 
Jews have not always been a conglomerate of different social, cultural, and spiritual 
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encompassing divinity of God, thus denying an independent, autonomous, or 
self-signifying realm of Nature with its own energies and laws. The second 
asserts an objection to the making or worshipping of idols, including any sense 
that works of art have a spiritual value or meaning on their own. The third, in 
decreeing a necessary observance of the Sabbath in memory and honour of the 
creation of the world ex nihilo, involves mankind in a contractual relationship 
to God to continue the work of creation and to subordinate the material, shape, 
and power of the created world – ha-olam hazeh – to the world in the process 
of always becoming, above and other than this one, the world to be (ha-olam 
habah).
24
  
Yet, as conceived by Jewish tradition, the processes of creation and 
perfecting of the universe, engaged in both by human beings and by God, do 
not lead to the abolition of time and space, or of the material and shape of this 
world, but to its sanctification. The heavens and the earth created by God were 
designated as good, not perfect or completed: good for human beings to work 
in and to bring towards greater and greater perfection, morally and aesthetically. 
Just as one says a blessing upon seeing some beautiful feature of the 
environment – a rainbow, a sunset, a field of flowers – so one ensures that the 
Torah, the house of prayer, and the persons involved are adorned so as to 
honour and bring admiration on the Creator of all.  
More than these fundamental principles of beauty, honour, and worship 
that lie at the heart of Judaism and the laws that permeate its views of the 
universe, there are other more operative features that make the Jewish artist 
feel more particularly at home in the secularized trends of science and 
aesthetics in the late nineteenth century. These have to do with the way in 
                                                                                                                 
beings arguing over a relatively limited set of primary texts; in the nineteenth century a 
new range of options for individual and group choice opened up. The question should 
not be what do Jews feel, think, and believe in. Instead, one should ask what do various 
Jews argue about and how are their arguments framed and conducted. From this will 
rise the other questions we are grappling with: why did so many Jews, when they found 
themselves uncomfortable with their traditional domestic, social, and religious 
backgrounds, choose to go into the arts and sciences, and why did they succeed so well, 
with their success usually not recognized as a Jewish phenomenon, except by the anti-
Semites? 
24
 This essay updates and expands on issues I first raised in Norman Simms, „Jewish 
Symbolism and Art,‟ Journal of Literature & Aesthetics, vol. 7, no. 2 (1999), pp. 7-13; 
and then ten years later in Norman Simms, „Fantasia, Enargeia, and the Rabbinical 
Midrash: The Classical Way to Read Jewish Texts,‟ Literature & Aesthetics, vol. 19, no. 
2 (2009), pp. 10-24. 
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which many Jews deal with a social and political environment that is not 
Jewish and often hostile to Judaism and Jewishness. In brief, these are the 
processes of midrashing the world, of studying deeply and of analysing, 
interpreting, and applying the interpretation purposefully and morally in the 
world.
25
  
The annoying doggedness with which Jews, in general and by tradition, 
engage in these questions and challenges – their insistence that laws be based 
on rationality and that justice be based on lawful reasons – has been a constant 
irritant in almost every society they have lived in throughout their dispersion 
around the world. The ideal of a horizontal society, rather than a hierarchical 
pyramid, at the summit of which sits a self-proclaimed king or pope or emperor 
who claims to be the source of all law and power, directly or indirectly, does 
not sit well with those who, by birth, education, or historical circumstance, feel 
comfortable only in such an authoritative and stable relationship. This is the so-
called V-spot found in Joan Lakhar‟s work, the trigger point of controversy, 
persecution, and worse. It is a sore spot in regard to hierarchies and 
authoritarian structures in art and science, in academies and in universities, in 
control of funds, honours, and the institutionalization of ideas.  
 
Midrashing in Art and Science 
Pour  parvenir, ils prirent deux moyens: le maintien de la hiérarchie 
en leur faveur, la transformation des valeurs. Ils triomphèrent du 
monde en le dévalorisant. Le renversement qu‟ils opèrent est donc 
différant de celui des décadents; ceux-ci subissent l‟évaluation 
spontanément antinaturelle de leur instinct affaiblis. Les Juifs, eux, 
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 Midrash has become a fairly common term in art and literary criticism today, but in 
the process has often been vitiated into meaning nothing more than a radical 
commentary or a poetic enhancement without systematic or scientific rules. More 
accurately, and especially as I use the term as a verb (to midrash, to be midrashed, and 
so on), it should be understood to be a dynamic and creative extrapolation of traditional 
rabbinical methods: to learn to read a sacred text by careful philological knowledge, 
grammar, etymology, and literary history; to begin to explode the accepted given 
meanings and applications of the text through recontextualizing, that is, shifting the 
boundaries of coherence and continuity; to find appropriate new interpretations and 
applications by adjustment to real-world situations and circumstances; and to open up 
the original textual poetic, creative, speculative „play‟ in the sounds, shapes, and 
configuration of the words and phrases used. Midrashing can and does include visual 
and tactile transformations, from the marginal illuminations in manuscripts through to 
visual depictions of ceremonial or historical events all the way to purposive redirection 
of political and psychological choices in life. 
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volontairement donnèrent l‟illusion d‟être des faibles, en prirent le 
masque pour pouvoir demeurer en vie.
26
 
This kind of midrashing, as opposed to a purely textual practice, happens first 
by questioning the givens served up by all societies as the true, the beautiful, 
and the natural. These acts of interrogation undermine the unquestioned 
certainties that are hidden beneath myth, ideology, and iconic imagery. 
Secondly, the powers-that-be which claim authority by virtue of their strength 
and control over violence are challenged, not so much by acts of counter-
violence, but much more by assertions of independence of thought. These 
include scepticism and principles of reason and commonsense, ironic and 
satiric ploys to undermine presumptuousness itself, exposing its dependence on 
sheer bravado and intimidation, and forced exposure of the duplicity and 
mendacity of the pretence by courageous defiance of the misplaced law and the 
command of irrational obedience to that authority.  
Such defiance, cunning, and stiff-neckedness are, within rabbinic codes, 
described as beautiful actions, attributes of individuals and groups who 
manifest the beauty and harmony of their coordination of soul, heart, and mind. 
Third, insofar as Judaism conceives of all races and nations as created by God 
and endowed with the divine spark, whatever is good, true, and beautiful in the 
nations and individuals in the world can and indeed must be incorporated into 
the Jewish mentality and culture. In other words, the Jewish artist and thinker 
in general draws towards, participates in, and creates out of the dynamic 
conjunction with traditions around him or her new ideas, images, sounds, 
forms, and objects for the sake of heaven. 
Put another way, those Jews who emerged from their ghettos and 
shtetlech in the nineteenth century to participate in the technological and 
artistic advancements were already prepared to see, feel, think, and articulate 
themselves in ways that were similar to the developments underway in the non-
Jewish European world since the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Not only 
does a midrash question and challenge a given text, manipulating and 
enhancing it, but it does this by moving away from the notion of time as either 
cyclic, teleological, or fixed and endlessly repeating itself. Zman, time, is 
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 “To succeed in this world, they pursued two ways: maintaining the hierarchy in their 
favour, transforming values. They triumphed over the world by devaluating it. The 
inversions they used were thus different from the techniques of the decadent who 
surrendered their suppressed natural instincts to such a value, while the Jews 
voluntarily gave an illusion of being weak, wearing a mask in order to stay alive.” 
Sarah Kaufman, Les mépris des Juifs: Nietzsche, les Juifs, l’antisémitisme (Paris: 
Galilee, 1994), p. 88. 
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dynamic, explosive, and it shatters: so that while there appear to be periods of 
development and momentous occasions, times of remembrance and celebration 
or mourning, time is also shattered into instants, and these instants, like sub-
atomic particles, are worlds in themselves or even worlds within worlds, 
infinitely reassembling themselves into temporary shapes and forms with a vast 
variety of colours and textures. Like the Impressionist painters, for instance, 
who attempted to depict the impressions made on their psyches through the 
lens of their understanding and skills, the midrashist begins – but only begins – 
by parsing the appearance of the text, analyzing its grammar and syntax, 
recontextualizing its narrative or logical discourse, and interpreting its meaning 
by finding a just and ethical application. Then the midrashing proceeds further 
by interrogating itself, reassembling its particles, and pushing aside or 
expanding the envelopes of conventionalized time and space.  
It is therefore not the personal or group significance of a specific 
individual or generation that is most important, but the process of debate and 
dialogue, of questioning and challenging, of moving further and further back 
into memorable time and space to experience what seemed over and completed, 
and also more and more into a future that is open and indeterminate, which are 
all at the same time bound into the original energies of creation; an energy 
which is also, as Einstein pointed out, a temporary and reversible quality of 
matter.
27
  
The self that constitutes the lens through which the inside and the 
outside of consciousness communicate with each other in the late nineteenth 
century is shown to be dynamic as well, partly composed of innate genetic and 
evolutionary forces, partly composed of debatable and challengeable spiritual 
authority and moral guidance. In fact, this specifically Jewish attitude goes 
beyond what scientists and artists were trying to say to themselves about the 
new innovations in the machines à penser that were more and more available 
during the nineteenth century. For instance, Eugène Durieu, with potential 
application in our own argument concerning Jewish aesthetics, stated: “The 
camera is not a simple optical contraption which responds mechanically to the 
first comer who cares to try it out, but an instrument that the photographer can 
direct and control according to his personal feelings.”
28
 While it is respectful of 
                                                 
27 Silvano Arieti, Abraham and the Contemporary Mind (New York: Basic Books, 
1981); José Faur, The Horizontal Society: Understanding the Covenant and Alphabetic 
Judaism (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2010); Marc-Alain Ouaknin, Lire aux éclats: 
éloge de la caresse, 3me ed. (Paris: Quai Voltaire, 1992); Marc-Alain Ouaknin, Le livre 
brûlé: philosophie du Talmud, nouvelle ed. (Paris: Lieu Commun, 1993). 
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 Cited by Scharf, Art and Photography, pp. 141-142. 
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individual initiative, and honours even arguments that tradition holds to be 
wrong because they were propounded for the sake of heaven and also because 
the energy of debate is itself the great engine of discovery and analysis, it is not 
the individual who becomes the cultural lens for the period in which he or she 
lives in rabbinical tradition, but all the participants in the debate and 
conversation.  
 
Conclusion 
I wish to close by pointing to an interesting, provocative, and yet inexact 
paradigm, one drawn from psychohistory, in which the relationship between 
Jewish and non-Jewish artists and scientists are compared to the partners in an 
abusive marriage. Joan Lachkar
29
 suggests that it is possible to see in the kind 
of danse macabre that takes place between this complementary pair one person 
suffering from and needing the abuse of the other; the second, usually the male, 
seeks to project into the other the very pains and humiliations he requires to 
punish in order to gain some momentary relief from discomforts he may not 
even be aware he is experiencing. What seems to trigger the episodes of 
violence, whether in actual physical abuse or in terms of mental bullying or 
passive-aggressive intimidation, is the way each one “pushes the buttons” of 
the other, that is, how they provoke each other into the event that takes their 
relationship to the brink – or beyond – of breaking apart.  
This sore spot or point of contact between them arises from what 
psychologists call an „archaic injury.‟ In individuals this is some unresolved 
pain or humiliation in their earliest memories of childhood; in groups, such as 
nations or faith communities, this is some defining moment which separated 
out the founders of the group from their original family, tribe, or religion, a 
moment of definition that caused suffering and unresolved grief, which 
remains a source of irritation when jerked back into collective consciousness. 
This vulnerable point or V-spot – analogous to the well-known concept of the 
G-spot that gives extreme sexual pleasure, often associated with some part of 
the body not necessarily located in a primary or secondary sexual zone – is 
described by Lachkar in these terms: 
It is the raw spot of early childhood traumatic experience that gets 
aroused when one partner triggers an emotional sensitive spot in the 
other. The V-spot is designed to parallel the G-spot…It is marked by 
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the slightest provocation: one wrong word/movement and it‟s off. It 
blows! 
Marilyn N. Metzl describes the process of such arousal in a review of Joan 
Lachkar‟s new book on the V-Factor: 
The two dance around one another as long as they can until the 
relationship explodes. It takes two to tango – and to sustain a long-
term abusive relationship. The abuser and the abused form a bond, a 
dynamic, and a dependence. Expressions such as “follies à deux” and 
the “Stockholm Syndrome” (Trauma Bonding): capture facets – two 
of a myriad of this danse macabre. It often ends fatally. It is always 
an excruciatingly painful affair.
30
 
Though Lachkar and others have developed the psychohistorical 
implications of this phenomenon in terms of contemporary terrorism and 
instanced the relationship between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East as a 
model example of extrapolated psychological circumstances to a group event in 
a historical context, the model is also rich in implications for understanding 
how Jewish thinkers and artists related to their non-Jewish colleagues in the 
movements and schools associated with profound philosophical and aesthetic 
transformations in the fin de siècle. These changes have occurred from popular 
through to high culture and in the fields of quantum mechanics, relativity 
theory, psychoanalytical studies of dreamwork, painterly debates on the value 
of impressionistic and post-impressionistic art, as well as a myriad other 
controversies that mark the period.  
For non-Jews, a part of a process of epistemological and perceptual 
readjustments occasioned by new technologies of seeing, feeling, and thinking, 
experiencing varying degrees of disappointment, alienation, depression, and 
exhilaration, culminated around the year 1910 with an epidemic of suicides 
among these intellectuals and artists. The Jews, though in many ways 
undergoing similar kinds of negative and positive reactions to the scientific and 
artistic transformations, not only did not go through the same trauma of 
separation from their families and formal educations – as these outsiders from 
excluded communities which had turned in on themselves in regard to rabbinic 
institutions and modes of study wished to enter the mainstream Christian world 
and found that world more welcoming as it became increasingly secular and 
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tolerant, yet most open to them among the avant garde of thinkers and artists 
who were in a state of rebellion – these Jews were also able to discover in 
themselves and images in their personalities and in their cultural heritage that 
already reverberated positively with these rebellious movements.  
The apparent harmonious and fertile marriage between the two groups, 
the large and dominant Christian group and the smaller and subordinate Jewish 
group, was thus based on unsustainable delusions. The more the Jews among 
them pushed forward in advancing the new ideas and techniques of the 
philosophical and artistic transformation, the more unknowingly – often to both 
sides – they provoked anger, jealousy, resentment, and other negative feelings 
in the society that seemed to tolerate both the Jews and the intellectual and 
scientific trends they were seeking to expand and embellish. But, as can be 
seen in the way the majority of people, including the radical thinkers and 
artists, reverted to nationalistic clichés and exclusivist rhetoric with the 
outbreak of World War I, the Jewish presence and participation was felt to be 
intrusive, distorting, and decadent. Very often, of course, both Jews and non-
Jews denied that this was the site of their discomfort; but by the 1920s, it was 
already evident to almost everyone that the happy marriage was over. The 
limitations of tolerance and debate had been reached, and would explode again 
into outright violent repression of „degenerate art,‟ of „the Jewish sciences‟ 
such as psychoanalysis and atomic relativity, and of democratic liberalism. 
Nature was distorted and twisted again, partly into the pseudo-logic of racism 
and extreme nationalism, and partly into an irrational spirituality of 
environmentalism. What happened during and after World War II remains to 
be discussed. 
